The Ethics of Cutting in Line

Lately I’ve been going through some old pieces I wrote, and I have to say, it’s amazing how much one forgets over the years! In some ways, I’ve come so far, in terms of style and content. But in others, I may have regressed, at least in terms of forgetting things I once thought I knew. In any case, I came across this little light-hearted gem, and it made me smile.

I wrote this for an English course my wife was taking back in 2020. Enjoy!

The Ethics of Cutting in Line

Bertrand Russell, one of the most innovative philosophers of the 20th century, once said that “the point of philosophy is to start with something so simple as not to seem worth stating, and to end with something so paradoxical that no one will believe it,” (20). While not following this procedure so literally that it would fail should anyone find the conclusion believable, the proceeding exercise shall nevertheless count as ‘philosophical’ in that it approximates Russell’s technique by reasoning from the rather unremarkable premise that it is rude to treat others unfairly to the counter-intuitive conclusion that forming lines is just as rude as cutting them.

To start at the beginning, then, consider how much of a platitude the initial premise is: it is rude to treat others unfairly, at least where unfairness involves treating someone unequally because they are incorrectly considered to be inferior. This unremarkable observation tracks the characteristic of a misplaced sense of entitlement or superiority by the odor of insult that it exudes upon the unfortunate ones with whom it comes into contact. In fact, one apprised of such deplorable dispositions is technically classified as an “asshole” by philosopher Aaron James in his best-selling study of those by that title, (4).

The sensitivity to unfairness that fuels classifications such as this naturally generates expectations for lines: if one is formed, it should not be cut. Call this rule etiquette or social policy, call it ethics, but total strangers are expected to abide by it on pain of community enforcement and its violations are treated as offensive and even scandalous. In fact, it was found in a series of social experiments on cutting in line that line-intruders were met primarily with normative responses, such as reminders that they are in fact in a line. Summarizing this observation, world-famous psychologist Stanley Milgram said, “[a]ppropriate standards are enunciated for the intruder as a means of reasserting the socially sanctioned character of the queue,” (689).

To the rule’s credit, forming a line is something of an organizational necessity, lest crowded areas become un-maneuverable or disputes arise unnecessarily. Cutting in line can thus communicate to others that they are undeserving of the same privileged treatment, or that the cutter’s interests are more important than the good order on behalf of which lines form in the first place. Aaron James thus specifically lists the line cutter as a paradigmatic example of an ‘asshole’ in his study of the same, (5).

But if cutting in line is rude because it overestimates one’s value, as the foregoing suggests, then forming lines is rude because it underestimates one’s value. Consider how people are treated when a line is formed. It might be thought that one should be able to go sooner in line based on such factors as how pressed they are for time, how much in need of service they are or, dare say, even how much hardship will incur from longer delay – say, in pain for pregnant, elderly or injured persons. And indeed, the human condition is so generous with deadlines, hardships, and commitments that such factors are as common in lines as lines are in life. But this whole way of looking at things is apparently mistaken, because what matters instead is whether someone has taken it upon themselves to wait around rather than presenting themselves for service next. Their uncoerced decision, which is hardly martyrizing, is then worn as a badge of sacrifice, entitling one to service before everyone else no matter their conditions or circumstances.

Worse yet, these concerns, if voiced, amount to little more than requests for permission or negotiation which could ultimately be denied. But what has someone’s choice of just waiting around to do with having a genuinely good reason to be serviced next? Nothing. As such, lines trivialize important considerations by lowering them to that level of merit which accords to one for just…waiting around, and so are unfair and dismissive to those who actually deserve to be serviced sooner.

In the end, what is good for the goose is good for the gander, and if cutting in line is rude because it treats people unfairly, then so is forming lines for the same reason. But cutting in line is rude because it not only treats one as exempt from the call for good order that everyone is subject to but forces a longer waiting time on others as if their time is not as valuable. In short, cutting in line treats those who are equally deserving of priority as if they are not. It follows from this by parity that forming lines is rude, because it homogenizes people’s conditions and circumstances and so unfairly treats those who are not equally deserving of priority as if they are. However obvious or visceral the initial premise may be, then, it leads by a swift and simple logic to the counter-intuitive conclusion that forming lines is just as rude as cutting them.

References

James, Aaron. Assholes: a Theory. Anchor Bay, 2014.

Milgram, S., Liberty, H. J., Toledo, R., & Wackenhut, J. “Response to intrusion into waiting lines.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 51, no. 4, 1986, pp. 683–689.

Russell, Bertrand. The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. 1st ed., Routledge, 2010.

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