We are at a point in two of my courses where we are deep-diving into Thomas Aquinas. While studying various of his texts, such as his Disputed Questions, his Summas, and various Commentaries, I decided to return to Aquinas’ interaction with polytheism. There was one objection of his that particularly struck me as a fruitful site for articulating the difference between monotheism and polytheism. I have interacted with this argument over the years (you may recall the Problem of Deep Equivocity) but it has now occurred to me that it can actually lead one to a better understanding of polytheism.

It is my hope that this reflection will prove useful or helpful for others so interested in philosophically articulating polytheism, especially at the crossroads of seemingly irreconcilable disagreement.

I invite you, then, to sit with me and listen to Thomas. Talk with him through this, and see if you end up where I did.

In his Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1, Chapter 42, Thomas Aquinas addresses the idea that God is “one.” Amidst a flurry of objections to polytheism, he says the following:

“If there be two gods, this word ‘God’ is predicated of both either univocally or equivocally. If equivocally, this is beside the present question: for nothing prevents any thing receiving an equivocal name, if the usage of speech allows it. If, however, it is predicated univocally, it must be said of both in the same sense: and thus it follows that in both there is the same nature in common. Either, therefore, this nature is in both according to the same being, or else it is according to different beings. If according to one being, it follows that they are not two, but only one: for two things do not have one being if they differ substantially. If, however, there is a different being in both, the quiddity of neither will be its own being. But we must admit this to be the case in God, as we have proved.”

I find it extremely helpful to try to repeat something back to someone to make sure you’ve understood it correctly. Obviously, Thomas is not here, but an idealized conception can help keep us honest.

I understand him to be saying in the first place that if it does not mean the same thing for each to be, say, “God,” then, nothing prevents us from saying this sandwhich or that bottle of Lysol wipes is “God.” Naturally, we will find such suggestions ridiculous, or even offensive, but in doing so, we admit that we are trying to communicate something with parameters by calling each one of them by the same name. Given that we are being serious, and so do mean the same thing in calling each of them “God,” there is a sameness between them. But, in that case, they are either one God on account of this, or they are not on account of having in addition to this sameness some other individuating or distinguishing factor. But that would make them ontologically subordinate and complex, and so not divine in the relevant sense after all.

What an objection! We are the ones, after all, who are saying there are many Gods, and that each God is real. All Aquinas is asking is how serious are we about that? Do we really mean to say there are non-identical ones who are each this one thing, say, ‘God’? Or, are we not saying anything interesting or informative about them so that we may as well call anything ‘God’ in this completely open-ended sense of the word?

It gets worse too, because the logic only constricts with each breath we take trying to expand on the term ‘God’ so as to find something that succeeds in referring to each one–e.g. if we want to say each is “henad,” or “utterly unique,” or all-in-all, or the One qua participated, or whatever. Aquinas will just ask: do you really mean to say there are non-identical ones who are each this one thing, say, ‘x’? Or, are you not saying anything interesting or informative about them so that we may as well call anything ‘x’ in this completely open-ended sense of the word?

What should we make of this?

My initial reaction is “but Thomas, why do you suggest that the name ‘God’ is being applied to them? They are in the most relevant sense here superordinate, and so we are not then saying that each in this group is ‘God’, but rather that each one singularly is ‘God’.”

To this, I imagine that Thomas would be confused: “are you or are you not saying one thing of each?”

If we say no, then Thomas will reiterate that we are not communicating anything interesting or informative, and so anything may as well qualify as ‘God’ in this sense. But if we say yes, then he will just counter that either each one is the same God, or that they are different, but aren’t divine.

But perhaps things are not as they seem.

One thing is indeed being said of each, but because they are not coordinate, it is not the same thing being said. This is not a trick of language, but the force of logic: for those who are not coordinate, what is true of one could not even in principle relate to another as same or as different.

Thomas will say, “how can that be? So long as it is itself one thing that is true of each, then, by divine simplicity, they are each that thing, and so one. You may not call this the ‘same’, but it is that, that each one is. Otherwise, it doesn’t have an integrity of its own, and so must be something different in each case, and we are back to square one. Therefore, there is either just ‘God’, or atheism, Q.E.D.”

“But Thomas,” I would say, “for each to be one singular thing just is for them to be the same. But since they cannot be the same, the one thing being said of each of them cannot itself be some singular thing.”

“What then are you saying of each by calling it ‘God’?” he might say.

The only logical availability is itself. Its hyparxis. To call each ‘God’ is to recognize her in the innermost, irreducible sense of being herself. Beyond all being, beyond all category, and all relation, there is her. And there is no further terms to say what that is: she really is ultimate.

“So, then, the term ‘God’ does mean something different in each case?” I can hear him say. “Since, as you said, it would be the “same” for each to be one singular thing, it must then be “different” for each to not be one singular thing.”

But the reason they would all be the same if it were one singular thing in each case is because the “cases” then would be collated so that there could even be an “in”-each-case. Think about that.

Since they are not coordinate, the “cases” are not lined up, and so they cannot be compared and determined to differ.

The term ‘God’, then, signifies one thing in each case: this one’s pure unity; the ineffable one she is precisely as such. This is the best we can do to speak abstractly or arbitrarily about properly named individuals. I have no “form” under which they fall, and by which to refer to them. I can only capture in each case their superlative and supraintelligble metaphysical unity.