Dumsday makes a lot of engaging, interesting, and provocative points throughout his work, but this final post will focus on two of his points in particular: (iii) inferring plurality from transcendence, and (iv) mapping the abstract to what’s on the ground. Of these, the first will take far more of our time.

I. Inferring plurality from transcendence

Dumsday says that he remains puzzled by my claim “that the henad’s transcendence of all natures and categories automatically entails that there is a multitude of them.” ¹ He then cites my (2022, p.14) to give the argument. We can summarize it like this: since Gods (used interchangeably with ‘henads’) do not belong to any ontological category, then, a fortiori, none of them does so as its only, sole, or exclusive member. That is, for any God whosoever, they cannot even in principle be the only God. So, Monotheism is impossible, and that makes Polytheism necessary. Theism just is Polytheism.

Dumsday confesses that even if we were to grant “the contentious proposition that something could exist without belonging to any ontological category…the claim that such an unclassifiable entity would have to exist as part of a plurality of like entities strikes me as a non sequitur…If such an entity is possible, why could we not say of it that it is the only entity transcending all ontological categories, and leave it (without any obvious incoherence) at that?” ²

The first thing I wanted to say is that, for the unfamiliar reader, I arrive in my (2022) at the existence of something beyond any ontological category by taking to its logical conclusion the idea of Theism as the proposal or affirmation that something is beyond Nature–or, equivalently, that there is more to reality than Nature. So, as to whether such a thing is “possible,” to use Dumsday’s language above, I will simply say for now that this widely embraced form of Theism depends on it. The idea is that what Nature is, minimally, is sensible and intelligible reality. So, to transcend Nature is to be ineffable, or beyond all ontological category.

This notion of Nature could have counter-intuitive results for some, depending on what they think Nature consists of since it will include as “natural” anything that is essentially intelligible–be that the transcendent Forms of Plato, the sui generis Angels of Aquinas, or a terrorizing poltergeist prowling about an abandoned home. Whatever it turns out would need to be included, I think these kinds of cases will be outliers and counter-intuitive mostly to those who have conceptually reduced Nature to specific versions of the physical, or material. But these positions are distinct in the literature–Physicalism or Materialism and Naturalism–and Naturalism itself has moved in this global, worldview contender direction (as championed by e.g. Oppy).

With that said, let’s dig in. Dumsday wonders at an automatic entailment from transcendence to plurality. He asks “If such an entity is possible, why could we not say of it that it is the only entity transcending all ontological categories[?]” Recall, however, that there is nothing for such an entity to be the only one of. The phrase ‘the only x’ is a quantification: it is counting how many there are of something. This idea of counting has two parts to it, and we will return shortly to the first. But, for now, consider that there is no such ‘something’ around at the henadic level for a God to ‘belong’ to, and so, a fortiori, no such category, set, class, or genus around for a God to belong to exclusively, or solitarily. Otherwise, we have an ontological category at the ‘top’, prior even to Gods, so that nothing transcends Nature, and that is just another name for Atheism. Agent must precede structure on a Theism that is a looking beyond of Nature. So, the conclusion goes, whether it is Poseidon, Ra, Thor, Ganesha, or YHWH, whichever God there is, it cannot even in principle be the ‘only’ one. The only one of what, we would have to ask.

Keep in mind (as I get into in Section 2.2 of my (2022)) that this is not to say that for any given deity, she will belong to an ontological category, just not as its only member, or as one of many others. What, then, is she not the ‘only’ one of?

One another.

Longtime readers might recall this post where I interacted with Lloyd P. Gerson’s Monotheism. Toward the end, I condensed a polycentric reasoning which we can reproduce like this:

1. Let a plurality =df. what forms when individuals have something in common. (Definition)
2. Assume Divine Simplicity; God is a way of being whatever it has. (Assumption)
3. If there is a plurality of Gods, they have something in common. (From 1)
4. If they have something in common, they are each a way of being it. (From 2)
5. If they are each a way of being it, then they are each a way of being one another. (Ex hypothesi)
6. Therefore, if there is a plurality of Gods, they are each a way of being one another. (3-5, H.S.)

Recall that Dumsday puzzled over the inference to “a plurality of like entities.” With respect to what, you might wonder, are they “like” each other? Dumsday has already noted that I have placed henads above any nature and all ontological categories. So, what is left for them to have in virtue of which to resemble one another?

As is implied in (6) above, there is a distinction between a henad insofar as she is her own way of being all the others, and a henad insofar as she is one of the ones that another henad is. That is, we can distinguish between a henad qua in another, and a henad qua that in which others are; between a henad qua center in relation to which others are coordinate, or peripheral and a henad qua peripheral or coordinate to another qua center. Henads are only capable of being ‘like’ each other when they are on the periphery (or what I call ‘predicate position’). That is the first logical moment or site at which they can be said to ‘have’ something (the center) in common, and so where a divine plurality or manifold first arises. Logically prior to each being ‘in’ the same center, they are not like dots scattered across a common background, waiting to be connected by a center: they are superordinate, and so not coordinate with one another.

They are each in a logically prior state to their forming an all. This initial state is a sort of hyper-plurality wherein one might be tempted to say it is for each God as if she were the only God. But this way of looking at things risks smuggling in relationality, and the space of hyper-plurality simply has its eyes too lost on each God as she is in herself to see anything else. It is, for each God, a state occupied singularly and wholly by that God. They are numerically plural, but not formally plural.

But the polycentric inference Dumsday is chewing on need not require seeing hyper-plurality as a genuine plurality, and so one need not be thought of as inferring a plurality of centers. It could rather aim at a plurality of peripherals for each center. ³

Remember, the polytheist thesis, if we should speak in this manner, most directly and immediately affirms each God, not a plurality of Gods. What is more regularly regarded as a plurality of Gods is a logical consequence of the polytheist thesis, though it has become its face on account of its popularization.

One way of putting the inference, then, is not that one belongs to a formal plurality simply in virtue of transcending all ontological categories, but that in virtue of transcending all ontological categories, one is thereby in a numerical plurality, both as center to all and as periphery of each. The very fact of transcending all ontological categories means that one will have a periphery of her own, and will in turn be on the periphery of another.

The ‘center’ of the divine manifold is each God, rather than only one, and hence polycentric rather than monocentric.

Another way of putting the inference, however, is that because each God is wholly unique, a fact recognizable on account of transcendence, and her individuality is what is visible at the highest level, then there simply is nothing in her individuality to exclude any other wholly unique One from existing. By analogy, there is nothing in a proper name itself to exclude anything else from having another proper name. Any properly named individual is trivially compatible with there being others. Now, Dumsday might say sheer compatibility with a scenario does not translate into that scenario being real: we cannot infer actuality from possibility. But, as we have seen, for any given deity whosoever, she cannot even in principle be the only one.

The ancient Platonists held that there is no determinate upper bound to the amount of Gods there are, and this is because at the height of abstraction, there is only each, not all. ⁴ One way of putting this is that Deity precedes Number, and so the upper bound of Gods could not in principle be of any determinate numerical amount, like 0 or 1 (or 3!).

But another way of putting this that I have recently found helpful is that each God is, at this level, equivocal to one another, and equivocals are uncountable. To “count” something is to locate it in a series; it is for that thing to have seriality. Alternatively, it is for something to have boundedness, limit, shape, or intelligibility. But there can be no series of equivocals, nor any such means by which to be counted, for their equivocity just is for them to lack any shared tag or mark by which to be connected. The set is ill-defined; it’s a 404 error.

It was said above that Monotheism is inherently quantificational: it counts how many Gods there are. But as we have seen, Polytheism is not like this. On account of this disparity, the disagreement between Polytheism and Monotheism is not mathematical: polytheists have the same disagreement with monotheists that they do with atheists.

II. Mapping the Abstract to what’s on the Ground

Dumsday suspects “that many of today’s practicing polytheists will have concerns about some of the implications of this Proclean polycentric model, insofar as it conflicts with beliefs that are held amongst Neopagans,” (51). The concern is that if this model was intended to be for pagans what, say, Thomism is for Roman Catholics, or Naturalism is for atheists, then it seems much more work needs to be done on this because the Proclean system just seems too far removed from the actual experiences of Neopagans.

This is a concern that is close to home because I have encountered it numerous times over the years from practicing polytheists.

But, if I could share a couple thoughts, I would say first that Platonism is not a competitor in the market of ideas. Or, at least, it doesn’t take itself to be that. Rather, Platonism aspires to explain how any ontology could be or work, and so has its sights set far higher than producing an account of its own of what there is. Its discoveries and posits are all but empty and thereby capable of being tools for different ontologies. I argue in a forthcoming work that this is what it takes of a polytheist philosophy.

The second impression I wish to share is that there are different ways of depicting Gods: experientially or phenomenologically; mythically or symbolically, and formally or philosophically. One of the things I like about the Platonic account of Polytheism is that it can go as deep as the insatiable human mind cares to, but it never seeks to revise or correct the details of actual ontologies–as it probably would if it were itself just another ontology. In other words, it does not reduce the Gods of our actual encounters to some higher-order metaphysical principle. Rather, it protects Gods from being reduced to their appearances in our encounters with them. It says yes, the Gods are as you experienced them; they are as their mythic depictions say, and so forth, but they are not just any of these. They are irreducible, and so, so much more.

Lastly, where Paganism is something like the affirmation of the full-orbed truth of each religious tradition, should we ask ourselves what it would take for Paganism to be true, I think Polycentric Polytheism is the answer we would arrive at. The object of religious regard for each tradition would have to exist (Polytheism), and each tradition’s narrative about that object(s) would have to be true (distinct ontologies). There would need to be, in other words, different cosmic perspectives, the religious participation in and articulation of which constitute a religious tradition. This would not revise, qualify, or preclude the actual experiences or even beliefs of the members on the ground. It would just mean the Gods are not reducible to any layer of their substratum in which they deem to appear.

III. Conclusion

I can’t thank Travis enough for giving polytheist thinkers the opportunity to bring their ideas in more open ways to more scholarly discussions, and for doing so in a charitable and rigorous way. I can only hope that people are inspired to do the same and feel a sense of freedom to think about Polytheism in serious terms. For my part, I would love to publish on the topic–whether in journals or something like a 5 Views on book, etc. But for now, I just wanted to think through some of these and hopefully articulate things in a better way.

Nothing can replace reading the primary text itself, and so I highly encourage folks to give Travis’ book a read if you can get a copy. He raises other concerns and interesting points for my works as well. Perhaps for another time!

I hope I haven’t muddled things, and that I have been as thoughtful and charitable as Dumsday. I just had to blog about it!

Thank you for reading!

1. Dumsday, Travis. Alternative Conceptions of the Spiritual Polytheism, Animism, and More in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2024, 51. ↩︎
2. Ibid. 51. ↩︎
3. Incidentally, it seems it is a failed recognition of or a structural inability to countenance this higher-order domain that lurks behind almost every monotheist objection to Polytheism. Perhaps a subject for a future paper. ↩︎
4. e.g. Syrianus says in his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (145.25-8) that “one must say that the divine entities are potentially infinite, but in fact are circumscribed by a finite number; what that number is, however, an individual soul could not say, except that it is of such a size as the first principles of these extend to in their wish to produce a different number for each class of being.” – Syrianus: On Aristotle Metaphysics 13-14. Translated by John Dillon and Dominic O’Meara, Bloomsbury Academic, 2014,117. ↩︎